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Religious Freedom cases
Child Evangelism Fellowship of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Stafford Township School District,
386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004)
Note: This case has received significant coverage in the press.
A New Jersey school
district’s policies and practices governing use of its facilities and
distribution of literature by outside groups prohibited use by the Child
Evangelism Fellowship and its Good News Clubs that met after school for
fear of violating the Establishment Clause and other reasons such as the
effects of the request on the children.
The district permitted a host of other organizations to
distribute literature and use their facilities, however, such as the
Lion’s Club, the 4-H Club, Boy’s and Girl’s Scouts, and so on.
The district court
granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Child Evangelism
Fellowship. On appeal,
Judge Alito affirmed. Point
by point, Judge Alito showed why the arguments of the school district
were not well considered. The
speech involved here was private, not public speech, and thus the
Establishment Clause did not apply.
By opening the schools for use by others, the district had
created a limited public forum in which the Child Evangelism Fellowship
was free to engage in speech and speech-related activities of its own
choosing. Furthermore, by
excluding only the religious group, the district had engaged in
impermissible viewpoint-discrimination.
Judge Alito’s opinion
is remarkable not only for its result, but for the lengths to which it
chastises the school for its hostility against religion.
Most courts will not criticize the schools, even when entering
judgment against them. By
contrast, Judge Alito details the extent to which the school district
here went in its attempts to conceal its hostility:
“In its brief, Stafford offers a list of other, purportedly
viewpoint-neutral reasons for excluding Child Evangelism. . . These
rationalizations are either incoherent or euphemisms for viewpoint-based
religious discrimination.” Id.
at 527 (emphasis added).
Judge Alito also
exonerates proselytizing, which is often made the subject of particular
abuse by government entities:
To proselytize means both “to recruit members for an institution, team, or group” and “to convert from one religion, belief, opinion, or party to another.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1821 (1976). The record shows that Stafford does not reject groups that proselytize in the sense of recruiting members. Many of the groups specifically approved in the Stafford rules do so, and the record contains numerous flyers-produced by groups from the Cub Scouts to the local wrestling club-that Stafford has distributed and that seek to recruit members. See JA 338, 346-47, 350, 352-57.
What Stafford appears to mean when it says that it excludes groups that
proselytize is that it rejects religiously affiliated groups that
attempt to recruit new members and persuade them to adopt the group's
views. This is viewpoint discrimination.
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
The opinion goes so far
as to publicly excoriate the district for abusive questions promulgated
during discovery.
In discovery,
Stafford propounded an extraordinary set of requests for admissions that
sought to elicit Child Evangelism's admission that it adheres to a
variety of traditional Christian doctrines. See JA 369. Stafford's brief
highlighted these beliefs as grounds for its actions, see Appellant's
Br. at 10, and at argument Stafford's counsel stated: “We
were concerned that, what the Child Evangelism Fellowship teaches
appears to be inconsistent with what we're obligated to teach, that
being diversity and tolerance.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 10. Suppressing
speech on this ground is indisputably viewpoint-based.
Id. at 530 (emphasis added). This
sort of treatment of the government, especially in matters raising
issues concerning the exercise of the Christian faith, is virtually
unheard of in the federal courts. Judge
Alito has here shown himself a champion of religious freedom.
Saxe
v. State College Area Sch. Dist.,
240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001)
Note: This case has received significant coverage in the press.
Facts: Parent
brought facial challenge to school district’s “anti-harassment”
policy, which prohibits, among other things, verbal conduct that has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s
educational performance. The District Court dismissed the case, claiming
that the policy merely replicated existing law.
Issues: Whether
the anti-harassment policy, on its face, violates students’ free
speech rights?
Summary: Judge
Alito, writing for a unanimous court (with one concurrence), first
explained that contrary to the District Court’s holding, the Supreme
Court has never said that harassment, when it takes the form of pure
speech, is not constitutionally protected. He then identified two fatal
flaws in the policy: (1) it banned harassment on personal
characteristics that are not protected under federal law, such as
clothing, appearance, hobbies, and social skills; and (2) it targets
both the purpose and effect of speech, where federal law only imposes
liability based on the effect. Finally, Judge Alito found that the
policy was substantially overbroad under Tinker,
because it ignored the requirement that the school reasonably believe
that the speech will cause actual and material disruption, and instead
targets a much broader class of speech.
The case is significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which
is that as argued, it pitted the rights of Christians to share the
gospel against the homosexual activists who argued that without the
anti-harassment policy they would be subjected to Matthew Shepard-like
attacks and bullying. It is
also significant because it involved the context of the public schools,
an environment in which Christians have consistently been denied their
rights. Judge Alito’s
opinion is straight-forward in many respects, but extraordinary insofar
as he unhesitatingly extends the protections of the First Amendment to
cover religious speech even in the schools.
American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey ex rel. Lander v. Schundler,
168 F.3d 92 (3rd Cir. 1999)
Facts: From at least
1965 until 1995, the City of Jersey City commemorated the winter holiday
season by displaying a crèche and a menorah on city property in front
of City Hall. The crèche and menorah were owned, maintained, and stored
by the City. Because the
date of Chanukah generally falls near that of Christmas, the crèche and
menorah were usually displayed simultaneously, but in 1994, when the
plaintiffs commenced this suit, Chanukah began unusually early, on
November 28, and therefore the menorah was taken down shortly before the
crèche went up. After the lawsuit was filed and a preliminary
injunction issued, the City put up a modified display that included, in
addition to the elements in the previous display, Santa Claus, Frosty
the Snowman, Kwanzaa symbols on the tree, and two signs stating:
“Through this display and others throughout the year, the City of
Jersey City is pleased to celebrate the diverse cultural and ethnic
heritages of its peoples.”
Issues: Did the
modified display violate the Establishment Clause?
Summary: No. The Court
held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by modified display,
to which city had added Kwanzaa symbols, sled, figures of Frosty the
Snowman and Santa Claus, and two signs referring to cultural and ethnic
diversity. The Court
stated, “We find this modified display to be indistinguishable in any
constitutionally significant respect from the displays upheld by the
Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984), and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City
of Newark,
170 F.3d 359 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999)
Note:
This case has received significant coverage in the press.
I. Overview of the Case
Faruq Abdul-Aziz and Shakoor Mustafa were police officers for the
city of Newark, New Jersey. The Newark police department enforced a
no-beard policy, one that allowed exceptions only for undercover
officers and for officers who needed to grow beards for medical reasons.
Aziz and Mustafa were Sunni Muslims who grew beards in accordance with
their religious beliefs. The department initiated disciplinary
proceedings against Aziz and Mustafa when the two refused to obey orders
to shave in compliance with department policy. Arguing that the policy
violated their free exercise rights under the First Amendment, Aziz and
Mustafa brought suit in federal district court and moved for a permanent
injunction. The district court granted an injunction against enforcement
of the no-beard policy against the plaintiffs, and the department
appealed. Judge Alito, writing for the majority, affirmed.
II.
Summary of Opinion
Judge Alito’s analysis of the case focused on interpretation
and application of precedent from the Supreme Court and previous 3rd
Circuit decisions. Specifically, Judge Alito treated the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment
Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
as controlling. The Smith Court
held that a neutral law of general applicability is not subject to
strict scrutiny even though it may incidentally burden religious
exercise. In relying on Smith, Judge Alito rejected appellees’ argument that Smith
is limited to cases involving criminal prohibitions.
Judge Alito nonetheless ruled that the department’s decision to
provide medical exemptions to its no-beard requirement, while refusing
religious exemptions from the same requirement, would be subject to
heightened scrutiny. Applying the heightened scrutiny standard, Judge
Alito found that the department’s denial of a religious exemption
violated the free exercise clause.
Judge Alito’s opinion
also displays an excellent knowledge and understanding of the Supreme
Court’s shifting jurisprudential standards in the area of the free
exercise of religion. His
analysis of the recent history of Supreme Court opinions in this area
may serve as a treatise on free exercise law.
III.
Judicial Philosophy
Judge Alito’s opinion in this case evidences judicial restraint
and strict reliance on precedent. Rather than indulge his own opinions
or look to extraneous sociological considerations, Judge Alito focused
on the precise wording and necessary implications of the controlling
cases. Moreover, Judge Alito took care to limit his analysis to facts
and claims contained in the record. He several times declined to
consider issues not raised below. Judge Alito’s clear, concise
opinion, one marked by deference to stare
decisis, raises no problems of judicial temperament or philosophy.
Soltane
v. United States Dept. Of Justice,
381 F.3d 143 (3rd Cir. 2004)
I.
Overview of the Case
Camphill Soltane (“Soltane”), a religious group home for
mentally handicapped persons, filed a visa petition on behalf of
employee Annagret Goetze (“Goetze”). Soltane sought classification
of Goetze, a native German, as a “special immigrant religious
worker.” The INS, and later the Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”),
denied the petition, in part because the agencies found that Soltane was
not a religious organization and that Goetze was not engaged in a
religious occupation or vocation. Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge
Alito vacated the AAO’s decision and remanded the case for further
consideration. Judge Alito found that the AAO wrongly determined that
Goetze’s houseparent position was not religious because it included
secular activity.
II.
Summary of Opinion
Judge Alito’s analysis of the case focuses on statutory
interpretation. In reviewing the AAO decision, he had to perform a
detailed examination of several U.S. Code provisions and federal
regulations. A thorough explanation of those statutes and Alito’s
conclusions is not necessary here; suffice it to say that Alito
interpreted the applicable provisions to mean that a job does not have
to be wholly religious to qualify an applicant for the special immigrant
status. Goetze, who led Soltane residents in festival celebrations,
Bible readings, prayer, and other religious activities, might qualify
even though her duties included “secular” tasks.
III.
Judicial Philosophy
Alito’s opinion in this case evidences judicial restraint and
an emphasis on strict statutory analysis. Rather than indulge his own
opinions or look outside the record to sociological considerations,
Alito focused on the precise wording of the code provisions at issue.
Moreover, he declined to issue a ruling broader than necessary, saying:
“We need not set forth here a definitive test regarding when a job may
or may not be characterized as a ‘religious occupation.’ However, we
think it clear that the AAO has failed to show why the position offered
by [Soltane] to Goetze in this case does not qualify.”
The opinion also
demonstrates Judge Alito’s profound respect for religious freedom.
He treats seriously a party’s claim of religious rights even
where, as here, the lower court’s and agencies have found against the
party.
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