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Selected Case Summaries
Opinions of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr, (as of 10/3/05)
Judge, U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
As prepared by:
Christian Legal Society
Center
for Law & Religious Freedom
November 8, 2005
MBIA Insurance, Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,
2005 WL 2420482
(3rd
Cir. 2005)
This case involved a
suit brought by the beneficiaries of insurance policies insuring payment
of student loans in case of default.
Judge Alito held that the policies waived the insurer's
fraudulent inducement defense, that the waiver was enforceable under
Delaware law, that the policies did not cover losses caused by the
lender's misappropriation of loan proceeds, and that a genuine issue
material fact existed concerning the extent to which the lender's
misappropriation of student loan proceeds contributed to the loss
suffered by the beneficiaries precluded a grant of summary judgment.
The district court was thus affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded.
Bronshtein v. Horn,
404 F.3d 700 (3rd Cir. 2005)
On appeal of the grant
of habeas to a defendant on death row, Judge Alito held that
Bronshtein's claims were not procedurally barred because the rule
applied by the state court was not firmly established and regularly
applied when time ran out. Judge Alito also found that the jury instruction provided by
the state court was constitutionally invalid but that the error was
remedied by the jury's findings on another charge.
He also affirmed the district court's ruling that the trial
court's failure to inform the jury that Bronshtein must receive either a
sentence of death or of life imprisonment violated due process under Simmons. Judge Alito
also ruled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a rule in
deciding Bronshtein's Batson challenge
that contradicts the governing law established by the Supreme Court but
that Bronshtein failed to make out a prima facie case. Finally, he rejected Bronshtein's other constitutional
challenges on the merits.
In re G-1 Holdings, Inc.,
385 F.3d 313 (3d. Cir. 2004)
G-1 Holdings declared chapter eleven bankruptcy after inheriting liability for a mass of claims involving asbestos. A motion by the representative of the asbestos claimants for a chapter eleven trustee was denied by the district court. Judge Alito ruled that the district court correctly applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, as opposed to a preponderance standard, in denying the appellant's motion. Consequently, the ruling of the district court was affirmed.
Fielder v.
Varner, 379 F.3d 113 (3rd Cir.
2004)
In this case the appellant, who was sentenced to life in prison after
being convicted of first degree murder, applied for a writ of habeas
corpus and the application was dismissed.
The dismissal was upheld by the District Court and by Judge Alito
who held that the appellants claim of prosecutorial misconduct was
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and that his petition for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence was not cognizable under the
federal habeas corpus statute because it rested on state rather than
federal law. Judge Alito
rejected the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit that determinations
of timeliness are based on the application as a whole rather than by an
examination of each claim individually.
Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc., 371 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2004)
The plaintiff in this
case was temporarily committed to a psychiatric facility. Claiming that the evaluations leading to his commitment were
defective, plaintiff brought multiple claims under Pennsylvania law
alleging that those involved in his commitment violated his procedural
and substantive due process rights.
Judge Alito affirmed the District court, holding that 1) four of
the defendants were not state actors merely because they were acting
pursuant to Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act and could not be
sued under § 1983, 2) those defendants who conceded that they were
state actors for purposes of summary judgment did not violate the
plaintiff’s procedural or substantive due process rights, and that
involuntary commitment, temporary confinement in a room with no toilet,
and forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs do not shock the
conscience, 3) all but one of the defendants were immune to state tort
claims under the MHPA which gives broad immunity to those participating
in the involuntary commitment process, and 4) that there was no evidence
to support the tort claims against the one defendant who lacked immunity.
United States v. Lloyd,
361 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2004)
In this case, defendant was part of a Massachusetts drug ring that decided to place a bomb under the truck of the ring leader’s enemy. The bomb failed to detonate. The district court held that Lloyd placed it there with the intention that it would cause more than $1,000 worth of damage thus raising his act of criminal mischief to a felony. Judge Alito agreed with the defendant that a sentence upon conviction of “possession of a firearm” should not be enhanced for “another felony offense” if the second offense is inextricably tied to the possession such as theft and carrying away of firearms. However, under the Blockburger, because the criminal offense at issue was not inextricably tied to possession and therefore constitutes “another felony offense” it justified an enhanced sentence. The government only need prove the increase of criminal mischief to a felony by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court held that it was unreasonable to conclude from the facts that the defendant’s actions were not intended to cause at least $1,000 of damage.
Rompilla v. Horn,
355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004)
This case involved a review of the District Court grant of habeas
corpus for a capital case in which the defendant was sentenced to death
when his attorneys failed to obtain some records indicating an IQ of
mental retardation and share them with defense psychological experts.
Judge Alito, over one judge, held that the trial court had
applied Strickland correctly
and that the defense counsel had not been deficient because they had not
taken all steps that might have been taken by the most resourceful
defense attorney. The court
also found that, though the judge gave constitutionally flawed comments
about accomplice liability, he instructed the jury not to consider that
theory in this case and that he then allowed consideration of all the
necessary aggravating and mitigating factors.
Finally, the court held that if prosecutors do not actually argue
an aggravating factor of future dangerousness (even though their
argument might have that intention), the defendant should not receive a Simmons
instruction on parole ineligibility.
The Court therefore overturned the grant of habeas.
United States v. D'Amario,
350 F.3d 348 (3rd Cir. 2003)
This case involved a
downward departure in sentence from that prescribed by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. The
Defendant was convicted of threatening to kill a federal judge by a jury
but was sentenced by the district judge to ten months less time in
prison than the minimum sentence prescribed by the sentencing
guidelines. Judge Alito
held that this downward departure could not properly be based on the
district court's difficulty in determining the heartland of the offense,
a finding that D'Amario was unlikely to actuate his threats, a
suggestion that D'Amario's letter could be interpreted as only
threatening the deaths of state judges, or the court's perception that
D'Amario had served an unfair amount of time for a prior conviction.
McCabe v. City of Philadelphia,
76 Fed. App. 464 (3rd Cir. 2003)
McCabe was arrested by
the police for violating a Protection From Abuse order by calling his
estranged wife and repeatedly coming to her home.
All charges against McCabe were dropped when his wife failed to
appear to press charges against him.
McCabe subsequently filed a section 1983 claim alleging false
arrest and malicious prosecution. Because
McCabe was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant and had admitted
visiting his wife's home Judge Alito found that his constitutional
rights were not violated and affirmed the district court's ruling in
full.
United States v. Jeffries,
73 Fed. App. 535 (3rd Cir. 2003)
Jeffries filed a claim of ineffective counsel based on his attorney's failure to file a notice of appeal. While noting that prejudice is presumed from a counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal when requested to do so by a client, Judge Alito found that the district court's conclusion that Jeffries did not tell his attorney to file an appeal was amply supported by the record. Accordingly, Judge Alito affirmed the ruling of the district court.
United States v. LaCroix,
69 Fed. App. 566 (3rd Cir. 2003)
The defendant was
convicted of knowingly receiving $3,7000,000 in stolen money, and he
claimed that the district court erred when it increased his offense
level for willful obstruction of justice and when it did not sua
sponte excuse the $100,000 fine based on evidence suggesting an
inability to pay. Since the
defendant gave misleading statements to the police and made efforts to
hide the money, the increase in offense level was upheld because the
appellate court could not say “that the District Court's finding. . .
bore ‘no rational relationship to the supporting data.’”
Since the defendant did not object to the fine on the ground that
he would be unable to pay, the court would only correct an error if it
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Given
the defendant’s financial situation, the $100,000 fine was not a
correctable error.
Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre,
321 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 2003)
In a Pennsylvania state
court, the City of Wilkes-Barre asked for and received an injunction
against the plaintiff’s operations because allegedly the restaurant
was a “common nuisance.” The
plaintiff filed suit in a federal district court against the city
alleging various constitutional violations, and the district court
dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
After reviewing past precedent, the appellate court held that the
plaintiff’s action was not "inextricably intertwined" with
the state judgment because a finding of constitutional violations
“would not mean that the state court erred in finding that Desi's was
a common nuisance.” The
appellate court concluded that most of the claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman and remanded the case to the district court.
Romero v. SmithKline Beecham,
309 F.3d 113 (3rd Cir. 2002)
Plaintiff brought action against employer under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) claiming a wrongful denial of benefits. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants because 1) SmithKline did not abuse its discretion, 2) SmithKline did not sabotage plaintiff’s benefit package, and 3) plaintiff was not entitled to a civil penalty because the request for documents was addressed to the wrong person. The appellate court affirmed parts one and two since the plaintiff had threatened an employee of SmithKline, and thus, SmithKline did not abuse its discretion or sabotage the benefit package by terminating her before she became eligible for enhanced benefits. The appellate court reversed the district court’s strict reading of the civil penalty provisions and remanded the issue to the district court to be decided under a “bad faith” standard.
Chadwick v. Janecka,
302 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir. 2002)
Chadwick sought federal
habeas corpus relief from his imprisonment for civil contempt in
refusing to comply with a state court's divorce order requiring him to
pay over two and a half million dollars into an escrow account.
The district court granted the petition. Judge Alito held that his wife had standing to appeal, the
standards of review imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act applied, and the state court's finding that there was no
federal constitutional bar to Chadwick's indefinite confinement, as long
as he retained the ability to comply with the order, did not warrant
habeas relief.
Carpenter v. Vaughn,
296 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir. 2002)
Carpenter's capital murder conviction was upheld on direct appeal and his state post-conviction motions were denied. Habeas relief was denied by the district court. Judge Alito found that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial but that he was denied effective assistance during the penalty phase when his counsel failed to object to the trail judge's misleading response to a jury's question about the availability of parole if defendant received a life sentence.
Truesdell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth.,
290 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2002)
This case involves a
contest over the award of attorney's fees in a section 1983 action by a
federal housing program participant against a city housing authority. The parties reached a settlement, memorialized in a district
court order, after which the action was dismissed as moot.
Judge Alito held that the order approving the settlement was a
proper vehicle to support the award of attorney fees and that the
participant was a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorneys
fees.
Bovkun v. Ashcroft,
283 F.3d 166 (3rd Cir. 2002)
Bovkun sought review of
a final administrative order finding that he was deportable due to a
final conviction for an aggravated felony under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). The
Board of Immigration Appeals asserted a lack of jurisdiction, because
INA removes court of appeals jurisdiction in deportation decisions once
an alien has received final conviction for an aggravated felony.
An aggravated felony includes "crimes of violence" with
an imposed term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
Judge Alito found that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the appeal for two reasons. First,
he interpreted the state offense of terrorist threats to contain the
elements of a crime of violence required by INA.
Second, he relied upon state decisions to determine that the
imposed term of imprisonment exceeded one year.
Wenger v. Frank, 266
F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2001)
After
Wenger's Pennsylvania murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal,
and he unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, he filed a
habeas corpus petition. The district court dismissed the petition. Judge Alito held that a Pennsylvania Supreme Court's order
did not apply retroactively, that the failure to seek discretionary
review with respect to ineffective assistance claims resulted in failure
to exhaust remedies, but because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
not have entertained the claims exhaustion would be excused.
He also found that the claims were subject to procedural default,
that procedural default of his claims was not waived, and that the
petitioner did exhaust his state remedies with respect to claim that
sentence violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights.
Judge Alito reversed and remanded the case to the district case.
Leveto v. Lapina,
258 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir. 2001)
A
taxpayer and his wife brought a Bivens action against Internal
Revenue Service agents, alleging Fourth Amendment violations during
agents' execution of search warrants at taxpayer's business and at
couple's home. The district court dismissed the action and the
plaintiffs appealed. Judge Alito held that the alleged pat-downs of
taxpayer and his wife violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the
alleged lengthy detentions of taxpayer and his wife while search
warrants were executed also violated the Fourth Amendment.
He also ruled that the alleged closure of taxpayer's business for
eight hours during the execution of the search warrant violated Fourth
Amendment; but IRS agents enjoyed qualified immunity as to all claims.
Keller v. Larkins,
251 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2001)
Keller, a state prisoner
serving a life sentence for the murder of his wife, petitioned for
habeas corpus. Judge Alito
found that Kellers' claim of violation of federal due process in the
admission of evidence of Keller's gang connections was barred by
procedural default and that no grounds existed for the revival of this
claim. He also ruled that
the failure of Kellers' counsel to object to the admission of testimony
about "sadistic personality disorder" did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The ruling of the district court was thus affirmed.
Khodara
Envtl., Inc., ex rel.
Eagle Envtl., L.P. v. Beckman,
237 F.3d 186 (3rd
Cir. 2001)
In this case a landfill
developer challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute that
operated to preclude construction of a landfill near an airport.
Judge Alito found that a 2000 amendment to the federal statute
mooted the developer's facial challenge to the 1996 version's
constitutionality. Accordingly,
Judge Alito vacated the district court's ruling that the 1996 statute
was facially unconstitutional. After
finding that the developer could have challenged the denial of
permission to construct the landfill in state court, Judge Alito found
that under the circumstances the developer's procedural and substantive
due process rights were unimpaired.
These claims were consequently dismissed and the case was
remanded to allow the developer to address any claims regarding the 2000
version of the statute in question.
Oran v. Stafford,
226 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir.
2000)
In this case plaintiff investors
brought a securities class action suit against defendant producers of
prescription weight-loss drugs, one of which was a component of fen-phen,
alleging defendants had misrepresented the safety of the drugs causing
harm to stock prices when the drugs were pulled from the market.
The court upheld a summary judgment in favor of defendants for
failure to state a claim, finding the allegations did not amount to
material misrepresentations or omissions on the part of the defendant
Syed v. Hercules Inc.,
214 F.3d 155 (3rd Cir.
2000)
Plaintiff former employee sued
claiming defendant employer failed to provide benefits in accord with
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), § 502(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The
court upheld summary judgment against the plaintiff primarily for
exceeding the state statute of limitations on employment related claims
U.S. ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
205 F.3d 97 (3rd
Cir
2000)
The United States
appealed a grant of a portion of a settlement to several qui tam
realtors on the grounds that their claims were not within the
jurisdiction of the district court because the claims were based upon a
public disclosure under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
The court reversed and remanded, disagreeing with the district
court’s conclusion that the phrasing of 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(1)
required all of the realtor's claims to be assessed as one unit,
allowing faulty claims to be redeemed by valid claims.
Instead, per Alito’s opinion, the claims should be individually
examined.
United States v. Roberson,
194 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 1999)
Roberson
was convicted of drug offenses and brought a second motion to vacate his
sentence after the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. The district
court dismissed the petition. Judge
Alito found that the application of gatekeeping provisions of the act to
the petitioner did not produce an impermissible retroactive result, even
though Roberson's filed his first motion before the statute's enactment.
United States v. Medford,
194 F3d 419 (3rd Cir. 1999)
The defendants plead
guilty to conspiracy, theft of object of cultural heritage, and receipt
and concealment of stolen objects of cultural heritage and receipt and
concealment of stolen objects of cultural heritage.
Defendants appealed their sentence.
Judge Alito held that the government had satisfied its obligation
under the plea agreement, that the government did not act in bad faith,
but that the selection of a midpoint between the high and low estimates
of the stolen items' market value as a measure of loss was arbitrary. He also ruled that an upward departure in sentence was
improper without notice to defendants, as well as that an upward
departure based on cultural nonmonetary value of stolen items was
proper. The sentence was
vacated and the case remanded.
Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co.,
180 F.3d 518 (3rd Cir. 1999)
A
construction company responsible for making improvements to a Navy-owned
pier sued a dredging contractor for damages allegedly sustained when two
of contractor's dredging ships collided with the pier. The contractor's pre-existing action for indemnity or
contribution against the builder of one of dredge ships and
subcontractor for wiring of the ship's clutch system was consolidated
with the construction company's action. Contractor, builder, and
subcontractor moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. Judge Alito found that a reasonable alternative
interpretation of the assignment clause in settlement agreement between
the Navy and the construction company precluded summary judgment and
that a factual issue as to assignment between the Navy and the
construction company precluded summary judgment.
Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Entertainment Centre,
193 F.3d 730, (3rd
Cir. 1999)
Mr. Caruso filed suit
alleging that the Centre did not comply with Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Blockbuster-Sony on
both claims. Judge Alito
affirmed the lower court’s granting of summary judgment regarding the
line of sight issue, and reversed on the issue of wheelchair
accessibility to the lawn area. He
found that “when viewed in light of the regulatory history…the issue
of sightlines over standing spectators [is not reached]…[and] [a]n
agency is not allowed to change a legislative rule retroactively through
the process of disingenuous interpretation of the rule to mean something
other than its original meaning.” Judge Alito found no violation regarding the line of
sight issue. He also found
the only way the E-Centre could justify it’s failure to provide access
to the lawn area was to show structural impracticability, which it
failed to do. Hence,
this issue was reversed and the case remanded.
SecuraComm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc.,
166 F.3d 182, (3rd Cir. 1997)
This is a trademark
infringement case involving two companies providing security and
communications consulting. SecuraComm
Consulting applied for registration of the word “SecuraComm” without
reference to capitalization or stylization, and was granted registration
on May 20, 1997. SecuraComm
filed suit alleging service mark infringement, false designation of
origin, false description, unfair competition, and appropriation of
name, good will, and reputation. The
trial court enjoined Securacom Inc. from use of the word “securacom”
and awarded the plaintiff 10% of Securacom’s gross profits,
treble damages due to the egregious circumstances of the case, and
awarded attorney’s fees on the grounds that Securacom, Inc. conduct
showed bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing infringement.
Judge Alito reversed the award of 10% of profits and treble
damages finding no evidence of willful. He reversed and remanded on the
issue of attorney's fees.
Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania,
156 F.3d 488, (3rd Cir. 1998)
In this case before Judge Alito, Mr. Dilawar Edwards, Ph.D., a tenured professor in the education department, brought an action against the California University of Pennsylvania alleging violation of his constitutional rights of free speech, due process, equal protection, and retaliation. These claims arose out of the university restricting his choice of classroom materials and directing him to cease and desist from using “doctrinaire materials of a religious nature.” Before trial, the district court dismissed Edwards’s equal protection claim, and granted summary judgment in favor of the University on Edwards’s due process claim. At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the University on Edwards’s First Amendment and retaliation claims. Judge Alito, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed, finding among other things, that Edwards did not have a constitutional right to choose curriculum materials in contravention of the University’s dictates, relying heavily on Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke.
United States v. Ramos,
147 F.3d 281 (3rd Cir. 1998)
After the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, Ramos appealed on the grounds that the jury verdict against him was in error because the prosecution had not proved “use” by the defendant by having a gun on a table or that the defendant had not been explicitly identified by name by witness testimony against him. Alito found that the evidence had to be viewed in the light most favorable to the government given the jury verdict against Ramos and that a rational jury could have found that the testimony referred to Ramos. In addition, Alito found there was sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction under a Pinkerton theory of liability given Ramos’s involvement as a conspirator (which was one of the charges proved against him at trial) and a reasonably foreseeable expectation that guns would be used in furtherance of the conspiracy. Ramos’s appeal on the ground of faulty jury instructions was dismissed because Ramos could not show his “factual innocence.”
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance,
130 F.3d 1101 (3rd Cir. 1997) (en banc)
Judge Alito wrote the opinion for the en banc court. Keller had sued his employer, Orix Credit Alliance, for age discrimination under the federal ADEA and New Jersey state law for not being promoted to chief operating officer and then later being terminated. The employer had won summary judgment at the district court, but Keller had won on appeal to a panel of the appellate court. The 3rd Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court in favor of the employer. Alito wrote that a reasonable factfinder could not find from the evidence presented that Keller could pass either prong of the Fuentes test. Alito found that there was more than enough evidence showing the employer had legitimate business reason for not promoting and for terminating Keller based on his performance and not enough evidence to show the employer had acted with discriminatory animus, even though the employer had made an age-related comment to Keller. For the majority, the same legitimate reasons the employer showed for not promoting Keller also supported its decision to terminate his employment and were not discriminatory on age.
Barton & Pittinos, Inc., v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
118 F.3d 178 (3rd Cir.
1997)
Barton & Pittinos
(“B&P”) was a pharmaceutical marketing company that sued
SmithKline Beecham (“SKB”), a pharmaceutical company, for antitrust
violations based on a contract between them in which B&P would
market one of SKB’s hepatitis-B vaccines to nursing homes.
The district court had ruled that B&P lacked standing and did
not meet the requirements for bringing an antitrust claim because
B&P was not “a competitor or consumer in the market in which trade
was allegedly restrained,” and Alito (writing for a panel including
Judges Cowen and Garth) affirmed..
The court concluded that B&P was not in competition with
pharmacists for the marketing and distribution of SKB’s
Belcufine v. Aloe,
112 F.3d 633 (3rd Cir. 1997)
A group of employees
for a Pennsylvania corporation filed suit under the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law against their employers to recover specific
sums of vacation and supplemental retirement benefits they claim were
owed them during the corporation’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy period.
Judge Alito found that the bankruptcy court had subject matter
jurisdiction and affirmed the lower court's grant of defendants’
summary judgment motion because a Chapter 11 filing bars claims that
become due and payable in the post-petition period.
Once bankruptcy is filed, he held that the officers cease being
“active decision makers” since bankruptcy law compels them to
refrain from making payments.
Meyers v. Gillis,
93 F.3d 1147 (1996)
In this appeal from the
district court's order granting Meyers habeas corpus relief, Judge Alito
found that the lower court failed to follow the guidelines of the
relevant statute and that Meyers had failed to show that the state
court's findings were in error. Judge
Alito also ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require an on-the-record development of the factual basis
supporting a guilty plea before entry of that plea or that a defendant
be provided with information concerning parole eligibility.
The district court was reversed and the case remanded to
determine whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent in light of all
the circumstances and whether there was merit to Meyers' claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rogal v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
74 F.3d 40 (3rd Cir.
1996)
The district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff for his contradictory testimony. Judge Alito found that the court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Judge Alito did not believe that the plaintiff had every opportunity to correct his inconsistencies during trial. The portions of plaintiff’s testimony the district court found false or misleading were not necessary to prove his case for defamation against the defendant. Therefore, Judge Alito reasoned he did not have the same incentive at trial to clear up the apparent contradictions as he would have had at an evidentiary hearing on the question of sanctions.
Flamer v. Delaware,
68 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
Judge Alito, writing for
a majority of the court (10-4), found that Delaware is a
“non-weighing” state and that thus the Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983), analysis was appropriate.
The court also found that the fact that an invalid statutory
aggravating circumstance may be present does not require reversal of the
lower court’s death sentence determination.
In a “non-weighing” state, no danger exists that an
aggravating factor which is only being considered and not weighed
against mitigating factors would cause reversible error.
Judge Alito rejected arguments that the interrogatories, which
asked which statutory factors the jury relied, were de
facto “weighing” state
questions where the jury was instructed that it could consider all
factors. Thus, the judge
concluded that the interrogatories and jury instructions did not require
reversal of the death penalty determination.
Nicholson v. Commissioner,
60 F.3d 1020 (3d Cir. 1995)
Writing for a unanimous
panel, Judge Alito held that to determine reasonable basis at law, i.e.,
“at risk,” the “economic reality” test requires that the
transaction be structured “to remove any realistic possibility that
the taxpayer will suffer an economic loss if the transaction turns out
to be economically unprofitable.”
Alito held that the Tax Court’s assertion that “no risk”
existed had no reasonable basis at law.
Lastly, Judge Alito held that the Nicholsons had substantially
prevailed in the settlement because, even though the deficiency in tax
was over $70K, the Nicholsons were only assessed a net deficiency
“between $2.5K-4K.”
Stardyne, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
41 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 994)
Corporation
and second "spin-off" corporation which had been created to purchase
first company's laser welding operation petitioned for review of order
of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) holding that corporations
committed unfair labor practices by bargaining individually with
employees represented by union, imposing new working conditions on those
employees, and repudiating collective bargaining agreement.
Judge Alito held that the NLRB's construction of the National
Labor Relations Act was permissible, that substantial evidence supported
finding that corporations were alter egos, and that the NLRB's failure
to follow or repudiate its prior holding that alter ego concept was in
effect a subset of single employer doctrine was arbitrary and
capricious.
St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala,
32 F.3d 805 (3rd Cir. 1994)
Medicare Part A provider brought an action alleging that it was improperly precluded from amending or reopening an annual cost report to reflect changes in the operation of its intensive rehabilitation unit. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the district court dismissed the case and the provider appealed. Judge Alito held that the court did not have federal question jurisdiction over the claim and the district court's ruling was affirmed.
United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse,
19 F.3d 138 (3rd Cir. 1994)
Judge Alito, for a
unanimous panel, found that the District Court erred in affirming the
Bankruptcy Court’s determination that it had discretion to appoint
Price Waterhouse, a creditor, as Sharon Steel Corp. and Monsesson
Corp.’s accountant and financial advisor.
Ruling in favor of the U.S. Trustee, Judge Alito referred to the
plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 367(a) that stated clearly the person
appointed to assist in the bankruptcy proceeding was to be
“disinterested.” 11 U.S.C. § 101 (14) specifically defined
“disinterested” party as one that “was not a creditor.”
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union,
11 F.3d 1189 (3rd Cir.
1994)
Exxon Seamen’s Union appealed from a
District Court order vacating a union arbitration award that required
Exxon Shipping to reinstate a seaman that was found intoxicated while on
duty. Judge Alito, over dissent, affirmed the District Court.
Alito begins the opinion by stating that collective bargaining
agreements, like any contract, are unenforceable if contrary to public
policy, so long as that policy is clearly defined.
He found that the Clean Water Act, Oil Pollution Act, Coast Guard
regulations on drug testing, as well as Congressional findings that
alcohol is a serious problem on vessels all established that public
policy favored vacating the award.
United States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115 (3rd Cir 1993)
Fisher appealed a jury trial conviction for three counts of transmitting to District Court Judges threatening communications in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) from a Pennsylvania prison. After the District Court had granted defendant’s several earlier requests for continuances, Judge Alito ruled that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s final continuance request. Judge Alito found that a witness’s answer implicating the defendant of an earlier conviction of the same crime arising from the prosecutor’s questioning did not provide a sufficient basis for a mistrial. He found that the argument for was not properly asserted in the district court and thus could not be raised on appeal. Judge Alito also found that the District Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the implications of a NGI conviction because the Insanity Defense Reform Act did not require it.
Moats v. United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Funds,
981 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1992)
A coal miner sued the trustees of an ERISA plan seeking a disability pension for injuries suffered in a car accident. The trustees had denied benefits on the ground that his car accident, which occurred in the employer’s parking lot while the miner was on his way home from work, was not a “mine accident” within the meaning of the plan. The question before the court was whether the trustees’ decision was arbitrary and capricious. Relying on the plan language and various policy interpretation guidelines issued by the trustees, the court held that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
Grant v. Shalala,
989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993)
A claimant who was
denied Social Security Insurance disability benefits filed a complaint
in U.S. District Court alleging that the ALJ who heard her claim was
biased against claimants. After
the action was certified as a class action, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services conducted an extensive inquiry and made findings
regarding the ALJ’s alleged bias.
The question presented to the Third Circuit was whether the
district court could hold a trial and make its own findings of fact
regarding the alleged bias of the ALJ or whether the court must instead
review the Secretary’s findings on that issue.
The court held that the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
405(g), required the district court to review the Secretary’s
findings.
Pa. Office of the Budget v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Services,
996 F.2d
1505 (3d Cir. 1993)
The State of Pennsylvania sought a declaratory judgment that it was not required to refund interest to the federal government earned on certain federal grant funds. The State had placed these funds in self-insurance accounts used to pay the workers’ compensation and health benefit claims of state employees who administer federally funded programs. The question before the court was whether the State was entitled to keep the interest under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 31 U.S.C. § 6503(a) (1988). The court held that the key provision of the Act – allowing the State to keep any interest earned on federal grant funds “pending its disbursement for program purposes” – did not entitle the State to the interest earned on the self-insurance accounts.
Elkin v. Fauver,
969 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir. 1992)
This case concerned the due process rights of prisoners in disciplinary hearings. The plaintiff prisoner was disciplined after a sample of his urine tested positive for opiates. The prisoner claimed that his due process rights were violated by the prison officials’ failure to use the correct form showing the chain of custody, as required by a previous consent decree from the district court. Judge Alito reversed the lower court’s contempt ruling for the technical violation and found that chain of custody actually followed still met constitutional requirements. Even though the prison officials technically violated state law, the prisoner’s right to due process was not violated.
United States v. Rodriguez,
961 F.2d 1089 (3rd Cir. 1992)
In this case, Judge Alito interpreted the “schoolyard” provision of federal drug laws that prohibits drug possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. The defendant was seen leaving a house that was within 1,000 feet of a school carrying a white pillowcase that the police believed contained cocaine. The defendant argued that the statute required the prosecutor to show she intended to distribute the drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. Judge Alito applied a technical reading of the statute in holding that the possession, not the distribution, must be within 1,000 feet of a school. He also noted the disagreement among justices on the Supreme Court with relying on legislative history but pointed out that legislative history only bolstered his interpretation of the statute.
Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin,
950 F.2d 122 (3rd Cir. 1991)
This case involved the interpretation of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Resource, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The state of New Jersey demanded payment under state law for its portion of environmental cleanup costs from Manor Care, a responsible private company. Manor Care defended on the grounds that CERCLA preempted state law remedies in this area. Judge Alito relied on legislative history, particularly Congressional response to a Supreme Court decision, and the express language of the statute to hold that the state law supplemented federal law and was, therefore, not preempted.
U.S. v. One Million Three Hundred Twenty-two Thousand Two
Hundred
Forty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Eight Cents,
938 F. 2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1991)
The United States brought a forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 against funds allegedly obtained from drug transactions. The US District Court dismissed adverse claims to funds and claimants appealed the dismissal of their claims for failure to comply with discovery proceedings. The questions before the court were, (1) whether the district court maintained jurisdiction even though the funds were transferred to a United States Treasury account and were arguably outside of the district, and (2) whether the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing complaints as sanction for discovery violations. The district court was affirmed.
Miller v. Indiana Hospital,
930 F.2d 334 (3rd Cir. 1991)
A surgeon brought
antitrust action against hospital and its medical and administrative
staff after hospital revoked his staff privileges. The district court
granted summary judgment both originally and again on remand in favor of
defendants, and the surgeon appealed. The question before the court was
whether the doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity recognized in Parker
v Brown applies to a Pennsylvania hospital’s denial of a physician
staff privileges, pursuant to its peer review procedures. The Court held that the hospital’s denial of physician
staff privileges did not fall within the doctrine of state-action
antitrust immunity absent a showing that the state actively supervised
peer review determinations. Judge
Alito thus reversed the order of the district court and remanded the
case.
Lewis v. Mazurkiewicz,
915 F.2d 106 (3rd Cir. 1990)
Lewis, who was convicted
in a separate criminal proceeding of assault, conspiracy, and possession
of an instrument of a crime, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney failed to interview and call a potential witness.
The witness may have bolstered Lewis’s claim of self-defense. On
appeal from the district court order granting Lewis’ writ of habeas
corpus, the issues were 1) whether trial counsel’s evaluation of
Lewis’ self-defense claim was reasonable in light of information then
available to him, 2) whether trial counsel was constitutionally
obligated to interview the potential witness personally before advising
Lewis, and 3) whether trial counsel’s advice regarding Lewis’
strategic options met constitutional standards. Judge Alito reversed the
writ.
Gridley v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.,
924 F.2d 1310 (3rd Cir. 1991)
Employee’s wife sought increased life insurance benefits under the employer’s group insurance plan, which was modified after her husband stopped reporting to work. The issue on appeal was whether the wife was entitled to the benefits under ERISA either as a matter of equitable relief or because an overview brochure that failed to define certain limiting terms qualified as a statutory “plan.” Judge Alito held that no provision of ERISA entitled the wife to increased life insurance benefits.
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